Stewardship Actions for Market issues in the National Disability Insurance Scheme: A Review of the Evidence by Malbon, Eleanor et al.
1
EVIDENCE BASE
© 2019 Australia and New Zealand School of Government and the authors. This 
is an Open Access article licensed under the Creative Commons License CC-BY-
NC-ND 4.0, https://creativecommons.orgw/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Issue 1 | Vol. 2019Article | DOI: 10.21307/eb-2019-001
Stewardship Actions for Market issues in the National  
Disability Insurance Scheme: A Review of the Evidence
Abstract
As the Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) pro-
gresses through its implementation, calls for stewardship of the new 
disability market increase. As a personalisation scheme, the condi-
tion of the disability service markets are tied to the ability for people 
with disability to access care services. Market conditions such as 
thin markets, market gaps and market failure threaten the public pol-
icy goals of increased choice and control for NDIS participants. We 
review the evidence for interventions and other market stewardship 
actions that can be taken by government to steward a quasi-market 
that provides care or welfare services. We assess the breadth and 
quality of the evidence base and apply these findings to the case of 
the Australian NDIS. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence 
to take actions to steward the NDIS market, but that considerable 
resources and governance capacity are needed to do so.
The National Disability Insurance Scheme is widely 
regarded as one of the most ambitious reform agen-
das in recent Australian history. Internationally, it is 
part of a growing trend towards ‘personalised’ care, 
where individuals have more say in the design and 
type of supports they receive from government 
(Needham, 2010). While the NDIS promises to im-
prove the lives of more than 400 000 Australians 
with a disability and their families (Productivity Com-
mission, 2011), the scheme has been marred by a 
range of implementation challenges (ANAO, 2016; 
Carey et al., 2017a, 2017b; Productivity Commis-
sion, 2017). In particular, there has been much con-
cern over thin markets and market gaps (Carey et 
al., 2017a; Joint Standing Com¬mittee on the NDIS, 
2018; NDIA, 2016a; Productivity Commission, 2017, 
2011). Under the choice-of-provider model adopted 
by the NDIS implementers, meaningful choice and 
control for participants depends on local ‘market 
structure,’. That is, the availability of multiple, com-
peting providers. Market deficiencies, such as ‘thin’ 
markets and market gaps, therefore threaten the 
public policy goal of increasing choice and control 
for people with disability (Carey et al., 2017c). More 
broadly, they present challenges for equity; individu-
als in particular geographic areas or with less com-
mon needs may receive poor quality services or no 
service at all (Carey et al., 2017c).
In response to growing concerns over the de-
velopment of markets within the NDIS, key bodies 
such as the Productivity Commission and the Na-
tional Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) have be-
gun discussing the need for ‘market stewardship’ 
(NDIA, 2016a; Productivity Commission, 2017). Mar-
ket stewardship broadly refers to efforts to address 
market deficien-cies, such as thin markets, market 
gaps or other market failures, and is also known 
as market shaping (Carey et al., 2017a; Gash et 
al., 2013). While the need for market stewardship is 
widely recognised, in the scheme design it is clearly 
envisioned that the National Disability Insurance 
Agency (NDIA) will only intervene when it can be 
demonstrated that market failure has occurred 
(Productivity Commission, 2011). This poses dif-
ficult questions about how the NDIA can detect 
market deficiencies and what strategies it can use 
to address them. It also means the NDIA must at-
tempt market stewardship before commissioning 
services to address market gaps. In this paper we 
draw together the international literature on effective 
quasi-market interventions in order to shed light on 
this problem. We analyse interventions that have been 
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effective or have theoretical promise internationally 
and determine their applicability to the NDIS context.
Background
Markets have become a common feature of public 
sector service provision internationally (Cutler and 
Waine, 1997; LeGrand and Bartlett, 1993). So-called 
‘quasi-markets’ proliferated under new public man-
agement approaches to public service provision – a 
paradigm that emphasises the use of market philoso-
phies and business sector practices in the delivery of 
government funded services (LeGrand and Bartlett, 
1993; Osborne, 2010). Proponents of new public 
management argued that markets could deliver 
services more efficiently than government; through 
competition governments can improve service qual-
ity while reducing costs (Girth et al., 2012; LeGrand 
and Bartlett, 1993). Supply-side factors have been 
accompanied by demand-side drivers including the 
desire to give citizens a greater choice in the design 
and delivery of the services they utilise (Girth et al., 
2012). Markets, it has been argued, give citizens 
greater choice through facilitating services provi-
sion by a diverse range of providers (rather than one 
government provider) (LeGrand, 2007).
In recent years, traditional market mechanisms 
such as voucher systems, that are familiar to social 
welfare history, has emerged under the guise of ‘per-
sonalisation’ programs. In personalised schemes, us-
ers ‘purchase’ services that meet their needs (in some 
cases via vouchers rather than budgets) (LeGrand, 
2007; Needham and Glasby, 2015; Williams and Dick-
inson, 2016). The trend towards personalisation has 
occurred in the UK, Germany, Scandinavia and the 
Netherlands, amongst others (Askheim, 1999; Ask-
heim et al., 2014; Brennan et al., 2017). One aim of the 
personalisation agenda is to move away from a ‘one 
size fits all’ service model, to a situation where citizens 
can choose services that best meet their needs – 
sometimes referred to as ‘particularism’ (Anttonen, 
2012; Carey and Crammond, 2017). Another goal is 
to remove the split between purchasers and consum-
ers of services that is the defining characteristic of 
‘quasi-markets’, in the hope of encouraging end-users 
to ration or ‘trade off’ services to achieve their most- 
valued goals (Productivity Commission, 2011).
Australia has recently embarked on one of the 
most ambitious personalisation schemes in the 
form of the National Disability Insurance Scheme. 
Under the NDIS, a AU $22 billion scheme, approx-
imately 460 000 individuals who have a significant 
and permanent disability will receive personalized 
funding budgets (Collings et al., 2016; Productivity 
Commission, 2011). The scheme will be fully im-
plemented across Australia by 2020, including in 
urban, rural and remote localities and across a di-
verse range of disability types and ages (Collings et 
al., 2016; Productivity Commission, 2011). Under the 
new model individuals are given funding packages, 
determined by their level of need and self-defined 
goals, with which to purchase services (Productiv-
ity Commission, 2011). While personalised budgets 
have been used in other countries, the Australian 
experience differs in several important ways.
The NDIS has been designed as a market sys-
tem from the ground-up, rather than introducing an 
element of competition into existing funding arrange-
ments. It is not one market for a single broad type of 
service, but rather a complex structure of markets for 
different supports. The scheme covers all people with 
significant and permanent disability and aims to cov-
er all their reasonable and necessary support needs 
(other than those covered by public or private insur-
ance schemes or Australia’s universal health system). 
This complex market structure may produce hidden 
market deficiencies, such as market gaps (a lack of 
meaningful alternatives) and thin markets (econom-
ically inefficient markets). As a national scheme, 
its geographical reach is considerable, presenting 
unique challenges in responding to needs of partici-
pants in regional and remote areas. There is no easily 
accessible block-funded alternative for participants 
with more complex needs, a feature in many per-
sonalised care schemes in countries such as the UK 
(Carey et al., 2018a; Malbon et al., 2018). Under the 
design of the scheme, the NDIA can only intervene to 
commission services where market failure has been 
demonstrated. Finally, the NDIS uses fixed prices 
and actuarial modelling in the allocation of resources 
to citizens, conducted through a federally owned 
statutory agency – the National Disability Insurance 
Agency (Productivity Commission, 2017, 2011). This 
means that interventions and potential levers are dif-
ferent in the NDIS than international counterparts.
Despite the growth of public service markets in 
various forms, problems persist (Lowery, 1998). 
Many examples of monopolies, market gaps or 
other market failures have emerged, from child-
care (Sumsion, 2012) to employment (Considine 
and O’Sullivan, 2015), and disability (Needham, 
2013). As a result, there is growing interest in-
ternationally in determining the most effective 
ways to intervene in public service markets (per-
sonalized or other) through ‘stewarding’ or ‘mar-
ket shaping’ efforts (Trevor L. Brown et al., 2006; 
Cogan et al., 2005; Gash et al., 2013; Girth et al., 
2012; Hudson, 2015; Scotton, 1999). In their 
 
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seminal work on the topic, Gash and others (2013) 
outlined a range of principles for market stewardship:
• Engage closely with users, provider organisa-
tions and others to understand needs, objec-
tives and enablers of successful delivery
• Set the ‘rules of the game’ and allowing pro-
viders and users to respond to the incentives 
this creates
• Constantly monitoring the ways in which the 
market is developing and how providers are 
responding to these rules, and the actions of 
other providers
• Adjust the rules of the game in an attempt to 
steer the system (much of which is, by design, 
beyond their immediate control) to achieve 
their high-level aims (Gash et al., 2013, p. 6)
While these principles are informative they tell us 
little about the actual practice of market intervention 
(i.e. what specific actions do government agencies 
take to shape the market). Hence, there is a need to 
expand on these principles through identifying and/
or determining specific stewardship actions.
Methods
We searched both the peer-reviewed and grey litera-
ture in order to understand what market-shaping ac-
tivities have been tried and detect patterns in what is, 
and is not, effective. We took a thematic approach – 
synthesizing qualitative insights from empirical 
case studies (Dixon-Woods et al., 2005). Thematic 
approaches to meta-analysis seek to uncover con-
cepts and their meanings from the data (rather than 
pre-determining them), using interpretive approach-
es to ground the analysis in that data (i.e. existing 
studies). Thematic approaches are useful for hy-
pothesis generation and explanation of particular 
phenomena, though provide less of a picture of the 
context and quality of the individual studies that 
comprise the review (Dixon-Woods et al., 2005).
The review sought to answer the questions:
 What thin market interventions in social care 
have been shown to be effective?
 What different attempts have been made to in-
tervene in thin social care markets?
Searches were run in the following databases: 
Google, Google Scholar, HMIC, Medline, Assia Pro-
quest, EBSCO, Social Care Online, Social Sciences 
Citation Index, Sociological Abstracts EMBASE, ISI 
Citation Index. The following search strings were used:
• (Thin market OR market gap OR undersupply 
OR underserv* OR market failure OR asym-
metry) AND (care OR quasi-market OR quasi 
market)
• (Market stewardship OR market shaping OR 
market levers OR market management) AND 
care)
• (Personalisation OR personal* care OR per-
sonal* budgets OR individual service funds 
OR individual* care OR individual* budget) 
AND market
• (interven* OR stewardship OR management) 
AND (quasi-market OR quasi market OR 
public service market OR care market OR 
employment market)
Inclusion criteria were: publication between 
1990-2018 (selected on the basis of market reforms 
commencing in 1990), empirical research, published 
in English and meets the criteria for relevance or 
rigour. Articles that did not meet the criteria for rele-
vance or rigour were excluded:
 relevance – whether it can contribute to theory 
building and/or testing; and
 rigour – whether the method used to generate that 
particular piece of data is credible and trustworthy.
In total, 675 sources were identified and 63 met 
our selection criteria (see Fig. 1 and Table 1). Sourc-
es were coded qualitatively, with insights into what 
interventions were tried to address which market 
gaps extracted. Eight of these papers were ‘inter-
vention research’, which sought to understand the 
effectiveness of a specific market intervention. The 
remaining empirical research was not specifically 
focused on determining the outcomes of market 
shaping activities but nonetheless provided impor-
tant insights. Given the small number of empirical 
sources, commentary and/or theoretical contribu-
tions were also analysed for potential market inter-
ventions. These are presented and discussed sep-
arately in this paper. The papers examined a wide 
variety of market areas (health, education, social 
care) and approaches (i.e. contract and commis-
sioning, personalisation).
Once data extraction was complete, findings 
were analysed against the NDIA’s statement on 
‘Market Opportunity and Intent’ (NDIA, 2016b), 
which outlines potential stewardship responsibilities 
and governance. The report provides an overview 
of how markets within the NDIS will ideally function 
(see Fig. 2). Stewardship activities identified in the 
literature were mapped against these market goals 
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in order to identify ways in which government could 
steward markets in accordance with particular aims. 
An additional category was added – stewardship 
activities that were aimed specifically at addressing 
equity. This was added because of growing concern 
around equity in the scheme.
Quality of Evidence
Findings from the research are summarised in Table 2. 
To construct the table, stewardship activities were an-
alysed against the goals of the NDIS markets (NDIA, 
2016a), and where corresponding evidence was not 
found through the review, cells were left blank. We 
also added a section on shaping markets for equity. 
Our analysis took account of the quality of evidence 
provided, noting where interventions and findings were 
empirically grounded and where there were non-em-
pirical theoretical suggestions. The literature on care 
market stewardship activities was too small to focus 
solely on personalisation markets, hence the findings 
outlined in Table 1 are drawn from efforts to intervene 
in any form of quasi-market focused on care. In our 
discussion of how such approaches could be lever-
aged within the context of the NDIS, our recommen-
dations attempt to unpack how to adapt stewardship 
activities within a personalised scheme. However, it is 
worth noting that stewardship activities (empirical and 
theoretical) are sourced from a wide range of markets, 
which is a potential limitation of the study.
Findings
Our review found that information sharing stew-
ardship activities are most often recommended in 
commentaries about market shaping, with one em-
pirical study to support this (Destler and Page, 2010). 
Information sharing attempts to address information 
asymmetry in the market (i.e. where providers do 
not know levels of demand, or users cannot identify 
services), and is a very common form of market in-
tervention in non-quasi markets. A wide range of 
stewardship activities were suggested or trialled to 
address market asymmetry, from market position 
statements (Bjornstad and Brown, 2004; Department 
of Health and Social Care, 2018; Feiock, 2002; Hake, 
2016; Institute of Public Care, 2016; Needham et al., 
2018), establishment of e-markets (Institute of Public 
Care, 2016; NDIA, 2016a), provider promotion events 
(Institute of Public Care, 2016) and open accounting 
within schemes (Needham et al., 2018). However, we 
also found that careful attention must be paid to the 
quality of market position statements and the infor-
mation provided. If it is not robust, it risks being un-
helpful to providers and market shaping efforts will 
be ineffective (Broadhurst and Landau, 2017).
Table 1.  Quality and number of source.
Categories Number References
Intervention studies 4 (Baxter et al., 2013; Hotz and Xiao, 2011; Ranerup, 2007; Temple, 2006)
Empirical studies with 
results pertaining to 
market shaping
16 (Abbott et al., 2009; Allen and Petsoulas, 2016; Barber et al., 2018; Beach, 
2017; Broadhurst and Landau, 2017; Cleveland and Krashinsky, 2009; 
Cooper et al., 2011; Destler and Page, 2010; Gash et al., 2013; Girth et al., 
2012; Iizuka and Uchida, 2017; Kastberg, 2008; Schmidt et al., 2016; Sood 
et al., 2017; Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2005)
Non-empirical studies 41 (Ahgren, 2010; Anessi-Pessina et al., 2004; Ardley and Chen, 2017; 
Australian Parliament Joint Standing Committee on the NDIS et al., 2018; 
Bagley et al., 1996; Barile et al., 2014; Baxter et al., 2011; Bel et al., 2010; 
Bennett and Ferlie, 1996; Beresford, 2008; Bergmark, 2008; Bertolin, 2011; 
Bjornstad and Brown, 2004; Bloom et al., 2014, 2008; Trevor L Brown et 
al., 2006; Brown and Potoski, 2004; Cogan et al., 2005; Crawford, 2010; 
Dassiou et al., 2015; Department of Health and Social Care, 2018; Dixon 
et al., 2003; Feiock, 2002; Girth et al., 2012; Grubb, 2003; Hake, 2016; 
Hudson, 2015; Institute of Public Care, 2016; Jaworski et al., 2000; Laing 
and Cotton, 1995; NACA Equity of Access & Outcomes Internal Wokring 
Group, 2017; National Audit Office, 2012; NDIA, 2016b; Nichols, 2012; 
Niemietz, 2015; Niklasson, 1996; Pacura, 2014; Penn, 2007; Poterba, 
1994; Scotton, 1999)
Figure 1: Prisma diagram of search results.
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Figure 2: Goals of NDIS markets (NDIA, 2016b).
Stewardship Actions for Market issues in the National Disability Insurance Scheme: A Review of the Evidence
6
A number of studies highlighted the limitations 
of central management of care markets. While not 
a personalisation market, Temple (2006) provides 
an important analysis of centralised efforts to di-
rect markets. Temple’s study highlights the ways in 
which the limited market knowledge at the ‘top’ can 
mean that efforts to steward markets go awray. In 
this instance a market gap was identified by govern-
ment, and providers were incentivised to move into 
a particular service area through a targeted fund-
ing program. However, with its limited information 
government wrongly identified the gap and demand 
did not support the new levels of supply generated. 
The money also had tight timelines on expenditure, 
which is frequently the case with targeted funding 
calls. This created inefficiencies in the market which, 
coupled with low demand, created poor quality ser-
vices. Temple (2006) argues that a better approach 
would be to have increased market intelligence and 
information in order to allow each provider the op-
portunity to consolidate their own market position.
Issues with central management of quasi-markets 
also emerged in the area of pricing (Allen and Petsou-
las, 2016; Gash et al., 2013). Within the NHS, flexible 
pricing and decentralisation of authority regarding 
pricing enabled commissioners to help organisa-
tions to re-purpose or shift their services to meet 
different market demands (Allen and Petsoulas, 
2016). This was done by enabling a financial buff-
er through pricing. While overall this led to a rise in 
costs, the authors argue that the benefits in terms 
of market responsiveness and effectiveness were 
worthwhile. Gash and others (2013) also found that 
central price setting tends to be at the wrong levels. 
Rather, given the geographical spread and diversity 
of needs that quasi-markets are required to service, 
decentralisation of pricing is likely to enable markets 
to be more responsive and effective.
The review also identified a range of stewardship 
activities that could be ineffective or damaging. The 
most notable is Temple (2006), discussed previous-
ly, which offers a warning against central manage-
ment of quasi-markets. Several other studies found 
that using third parties to boost choice/control and 
competition was ineffective (though using brokerage 
was effective to address issues of equity or niche 
needs) (Abbott et al., 2009; Sheaff et al., 2013). Pro-
viders were found to sometimes compete for bro-
kers or third parties rather than clients (Sheaff et al., 
2013). However, one intervention study (Schmidt et 
al., 2016) found third party brokers to be effective.
We also found instances where stewardship activ-
ities complicates other market issues. For example, 
boosting regulation to deal with quality issues reduced 
market competition (Hotz and Xiao, 2011). Similarly, 
when subsidies are offered there is some evidence 
that providers create services which are not fit-for-
purpose (Temple, 2006; Boocock, 2017). Again, this 
points to the limits of centrally managed systems. 
Some authors observe that it is difficult for govern-
ments to set effective incentives centrally without 
creating perverse market behaviour or outcomes 
(Temple, 2006; Boocock, 2017). Similarly, central 
price setting boosted service quality (as organisa-
tions have to compete on the basis of quality, rather 
than price) (Cooper et al., 2011), while other studies 
highlighted the importance of flexible price setting 
for addressing market gaps (Allen and Petsoulas, 
2016; Schmidt et al., 2016)
These findings highlight that there is no ‘one size 
fits all’ approach to market shaping, or hard and fast 
rules. With regard to market shaping efforts as a 
whole, Destler and Page (2010) surveyed local are-
as undertaking a range of market shaping activities. 
They found that while overall governments which un-
dertook market shaping activities had some impact 
statistically, there were no clear patterns regarding 
types or combinations of stewardship activities and 
their effectiveness. This research is an important re-
minder that markets are highly interdependent, and 
actions need to be responsive to different contexts.
Discussion
In this section we relate our findings to the context 
of the NDIS quasi-market. The NDIS is a program in 
active implementation and as such, the market stew-
ardship or shaping actions are part of an emerg-
ing and iterative approach, shifting in response to 
market needs (NDIA, 2016b). Our review initiated a 
number of suggestions for market shaping for the 
NDIS quasi-market, particularly for enhancing equi-
ty in the scheme.
Price is one of the major levers for market shap-
ing in the NDIS. There is a complicated system of 
price setting in the NDIS. Firstly, there are differ-
ent pricing rules depending on the sort of budget 
administration that a participant undertakes. NDIS 
budgets can be administered by the participant 
(‘self-managed’), or be managed by the NDIS, or 
a combination of both (Productivity Commission, 
2011). If an NDIS participant is ‘self-managed’ then 
they can negotiate prices directly with a service pro-
vider, using NDIA prices as a guide. When a par-
ticipant’s budget is administered in conjunction with 
NDIA the prices are far less flexible and at times 
fixed (Productivity Commission, 2017). The majority 
of participants are NDIA managed or co-managed, 
7
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brokerage organisations 
can boost choice and 
control (Schmidt et al., 
2016)
Web-based platform to 
support client decision 
making (Ranerup, 2007)
Using third party providers 
was not successful in 
boosting choice and control 
(Allen and Petsoulas, 2016).
Sheaff (2000) found that 
brokers tended to work 
towards the needs of the 
third party not the client
Skilled independent brokers 
(Beresford, 2008)
Satisfaction More regulation boosted 
quality (but reduced 
numbers of providers and 
competition) (Hotz and 
Xiao, 2011)
Creation of league tables (Bagley  
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Creation of league tables (Bagley  
et al., 1996; Dassiou et al., 2015)
Creation of e-market place 
and provider promotion events 
(Institute of Public Care, 2016)
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Demand-side policy that 
decreases patient sharing 
costs. Decreasing the cost 
meant patients sought 
more services, which 
drove innovation (Iizuka 
and Uchida, 2017) 
Use information from individual 
assessments and reviews to 
build knowledge of market gaps 
(Institute of Public Care, 2016)
Actively solicit bids from other 
markets/areas (Brown and 
Potoski, 2004)
New products Demand-side policy that 
decreases patient sharing 
costs. Decreasing the cost 
meant patients sought 
more services, which 
drove innovation (Iizuka 
and Uchida, 2017) 
Nurturing and mentoring 
providers (Girth et al., 
2012)
Use financial incentives for 
innovation (Institute of Public 
Care, 2016)
Create target product/service 
profiles (i.e. that govt knows there 
is a demand for and the market 
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More regulation boosted 
quality (but reduced 
numbers of providers and 
competition) (Hotz and 
Xiao, 2011)
Fixed prices boost 
competition over quality 
(Cooper et al., 2011)
Creation of league tables (Bagley  





for vulnerable groups 
(Schmidt et al., 2016)
Government was able 
to direct payments to 
particular geographical 
areas to build up staff 
and expertise through 
increased demand (also 
supported by providers 
being able to take clients 
from anywhere). (Baxter et 
al., 2013)
Provider of last resort (Joint 
Standing Committee on the NDIS, 
2018)
Greater funding given to people in 
areas of more need. This ultimately 
reduced quality and can lead to the 
creation of services that have no 
demand. Suggesting that decisions 
should not be made centrally and 
a decentralised system is needed. 
(Boocock, 2017)
Force organisations take on 




with self-managed participants making up just 7% 
of NDIS participants (NDIA, 2017), meaning that the 
majority of the NDIS quasi-market operates under 
fixed prices. Secondly, these prices are set by the 
NDIS actuaries, a body separate to both the NDIA 
and to the Department of Social Services. According 
to the (NDIS Act, 2013) expenditures must ‘repre-
sent value for money’ and the ‘long term sustainabil-
ity of the scheme’(NDIS Act, 2013) (section 34). As 
Carey et al. (2018a, p. 4) point out, this means that 
“the NDIA is not authorised to set prices in response 
to market issues”. Further, many of the stewardship 
activities examined in our review such as Allen and 
Petsoulas (2016) and Schmidt et al. (2016), also re-
quire there to be flexible pricing arrangements that 
are responsive to local market conditions. At this 
stage, it is (at best) unclear whether the NDIS actu-
aries can take local market conditions into account 
when price setting, and it is certainly not legislated 
that they must. We suggest expanding the criteria 
for price setting in the NDIS Act (2013), or finding 
another way to ensure that pricing can be respon-
sive to local market failures and thin markets. This 
could include devolving price setting responsibilities 
to those with more market intelligence.
In addition to pricing, another major lever for 
market shaping is information sharing about local 
quasi-market conditions (supply and demand infor-
mation). Our review found empirical work by Destler 
and Page (2010), in the context of thin market man-
agement for autonomous schools, which demon-
strated positive impacts when information sharing 
about market conditions. Further, much theoretical 
work supported information sharing in quasi-markets 
(Bjornstad and Brown, 2004; Department of Health 
and Social Care, 2018; Feiock, 2002; Hake, 2016; In-
stitute of Public Care, 2016; Needham et al., 2018). 
In line with theory and empirical research, the NDIS 
could release data or more detailed position state-
ments on supply and demand at a local level across 
Australia (i.e. LGA level nationwide). This will enable 
service providers to position themselves to meet gaps 
in the market where service provision is dangerously 
low or absent. There has been concern that such de-
tailed market position statements will pave the way for 
‘profiteering’ providers, so we recommend coupling 
detailed market position statements with powerful 
regulation over the quality of service provided through 
the NDIS Quality and Safeguard Commission.
Information sharing about market conditions is 
not possible if the data on market conditions in the 
NDIS is not being collected. While the trials of the 
NDIS included a full evaluation by Mavromaras et 
al. (2018) (of some market conditions, but also of 
equity in access and qualitative responses from 
participants, providers and other stakeholders), the 
national scheme has no government funded inde-
pendent processes for monitoring and evaluation 
beyond financial oversight (Carey et al., 2018a). This 
presents issues for market stewardship, but also for 
external and democratic scrutiny of the scheme. 
Currently, the NDIS participants that are missing out 
on their NDIS supports because they cannot secure 
services are uncounted (Joint Standing Committee 
on the NDIS, 2018). This gap in data collection, or 
transparency of data, in the NDIS presents major 
barriers to increased information sharing, something 
we know is crucial for shaping robust quasi-markets.
Market shaping must go beyond ensuring mini-
mum protections and efficient use of resources and 
extend to ensuring that public good is fairly distributed. 
As a national policy, the Australian federal govern-
ment is ultimately accountable for maintaining equity 
of access to the NDIS (Malbon et al., 2019; Malbon 
et al., 2016). Simultaneously, we also know that prob-
lems of equity in access are arising in many areas 
of the NDIS (Carey et al., 2017; Mavromaras et al., 
2018). In our review a number of stewardship activ-
ities were tested or suggested for increasing equity 
in quasi-markets (Baxter et al., 2013; Boocock, 2017; 
Brown and Potoski, 2004; Schmidt et al., 2016). The 
recommendations from these papers include:
• Additional subsidies for vulnerable groups 
(Schmidt et al., 2016)
• Government was able to direct payments to 
particular geographical areas to build up staff 
and expertise through increased demand (also 
supported by providers being able to take cli-
ents from anywhere). (Baxter et al., 2013)
• Provider of last resort (Joint Standing Com-
mittee on the NDIS, 2018)
• Greater funding given to people in areas of 
more need (Boocock, 2017)
• Force organisations take on contracts in dif-
ferent areas (Brown and Potoski, 2004)
Not all of these stewardship activities are appropri-
ate for the NDIS system. For example, additional 
subsidies for vulnerable groups is more difficult to 
operationalise than additional payments for provid-
ers who provide service to more vulnerable (and 
potentially more resource intensive) NDIS partici-
pants. Similarly, additional funding in transport budg-
ets for people living in remote and regional areas 
is necessary (Carey et al., 2017c). Our review also 
indicates that the newly established Quality and 
Safe Guards Commission must have the power to 
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respond to complains about service quality. This 
would mean the creation of a formal process and 
method of recourse between the Commission and the 
NDIA, which could require revisions to the NDIS Act.
We find that it may be useful to think of NDIS 
funds as a set of ‘vouchers’ that can only be used 
to fund specific care and support activities, rather 
than a traditional marketisation system. This is true 
in the sense that NDIS funds may only be spent on 
NDIS approved activities and providers. We note 
that rules around NDIS funds are more flexible for 
‘self-managed’ NDIS participants (12% of partici-
pants) who may choose to pay a service provider 
whether the provider is registered with the NDIS or 
not, and at a price negotiated between the provid-
er and client. So while the NDIS is not a ‘perfect’ 
voucher system, some direction may be found in 
the management of markets in voucher systems 
such as avoiding information failures (Steuerle et 
al., 2000) as well as the more complex aspects 
of quality and safeguarding that the NDIA faces 
(Daniels and Trebilcock, 2005, p. 226):
…one of the principal virtues of voucher systems is 
the competition that they are intended to elicit on the 
supply-side of voucher-assisted markets, thus requir-
ing a significant number of competing providers and 
relatively free entry. Most of the rationales for any form 
of government intervention at all in the programmat-
ic sectors under review are implicated in determining 
what restrictions, if any, should be placed on qualifying 
suppliers and new entrants(i.e. distributive justice, so-
cial externalities, and paternalism).
Above all, our review points to the significant capac-
ity required within the main implementation body for the 
NDIS (the NDIA) in order to carry out such a diverse ar-
ray of market shaping and stewarding functions across 
the many markets and sub-markets nationally. A lack 
of capacity has been noted by several high profile re-
views of the agency (ANAO, 2016; Commonwealth 
Ombudsman, 2018; Joint Standing Committee on the 
NDIS, 2018) and acknowledged by government (Aus-
tralian Government, 2018). Greater resources, and a 
lifting of the staffing cap, on this agency is critical to 
securing effective market stewardship.
While we have made a range of recommenda-
tions regarding the stewardship of the NDIS, re-
search on adaptive governance highlights that stew-
ardship activities need to shift as implementation 
shifts (Carey and Crammond, 2015). That is, an 
approach that may work well at one stage of the im-
plementation of the NDIS could over time become a 
constraint. There is a need for responses to be as 
adaptive as the market they seek to influence (Car-
ey and Harris, 2016).
Conclusion
Many principles for market shaping and stewarding 
have been developed in an effort to ensure qua-
si-markets meet their diverse policy goals. This re-
view has sought to go beyond these principles and 
collate actual evidence of what governments and 
government agencies can do in practice to steward 
quasi markets. Based on the results we sought to 
develop understanding of how this evidence relates 
specifically to the markets under the NDIS. We found 
a number of key activities the main implementation 
agency of the NDIS could undertake, in addition to 
other critical bodies such as the NDIS Quality and 
Safeguards Commission. However, in order to effec-
tively pursue these activities across jurisdictions, pro-
viders and population groups considerable resources 
are needed.
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